MODEL PENAL CODE ANNOTATED

THABO MELI v. REGINA

Judicial Committee, Privy Council
1 All Eng. Rep. 373 (1954)
 

 The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Reid.  The four appellants in this case were convicted of murder after a trial before Harragin, J., in the High Court of Basutoland, in March, 1953.

 . . . It is established by evidence, which was believed and which is apparently credible, that there was a preconceived plot on the part of the four accused to bring the deceased man to a hut and there to kill him; and then to fake an accident, so that the accused should escape the penalty for their act.  The deceased man was brought to the hut.  He was there treated to beer and was at least partially intoxicated; and he was then struck over the head in accordance with the plan of the accused.

 There is no evidence that the accused then believed that he was dead, but their Lordships are prepared to assume that they did; and it is only on that assumption that any statable case can be made for this appeal.  The accused took out the body, rolled it over a low krantz or cliff, and dressed up the scene to make it look like an accident.  Obviously they believed at that time that the man was dead, but it appears from the medical evidence that the injuries which he received in the hut were not sufficient to cause the death and that the final cause of his death was exposure where he was left at the foot of the krantz.

 The point of law which was raised in this case can be simply stated.  It is said that two acts were necessary and were separable:  first, the attack in the hut; and, secondly, the placing of the body outside afterwards.  It is said that, while the first act was accompanied by mens rea, it was not the cause of death; but that the second act, while it was the cause of death, was not accompanied by mens rea; and on that ground it is said that the accused are not guilty of any crime except perhaps culpable homicide.

 It appears to their Lordships impossible to divide up what was really one transaction in this way.  There is no doubt that the accused set out to do all these acts in order to achieve their plan and as parts of their plan; and it is much too refined a ground of judgment to say that, because they were under a misapprehension at one stage and thought that their guilty purpose had been achieved before in fact it was achieved, therefore they are to escape the penalties of the law.  Their Lordships do not think that this is a matter which is susceptible of elaboration.  There appears to be no case either in South Africa or England, or for that matter elsewhere, which resembles the present.  Their Lordships can find no difference relevant to the present case between the law of South Africa and the law of England, and they are of opinion that by both laws there could be no separation such as that for which the accused contend, as to reduce the crime from murder to a lesser crime, merely because the accused were under some misapprehension for a time during the completion of their criminal plot.

 Their Lordships must, therefore, humbly advise Her Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed.