MODEL PENAL CODE ANNOTATED

John M. MISTRETTA, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES
 
Supreme Court of the United States
488 U.S. 361 (1989)
 

 Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

 In this litigation, we granted certiorari before judgment in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in order to consider the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission.  The Commission is a body created under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Act), as amended, 18 U.S.C. 3551 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. IV), and 28 U.S.C. 991-998 (1982 ed., Supp. IV).  The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri ruled that the Guidelines [p. 363] were constitutional.  United States v. Johnson, 682 F.Supp. 1033 (W.D.Mo.1988).

    I
    A
    Background

 For almost a century, the Federal Government employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing.  Statutes specified the penalties for crimes but nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide whether the offender should be incarcerated and for how long, whether he should be fined and how much, and whether some lesser restraint, such as probation, should be imposed instead of imprisonment or fine.  This indeterminate- sentencing system was supplemented by the utilization of parole, by which an offender was returned to society under the "guidance and control" of a parole officer.  See Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 363, 58 S.Ct. 872, 874, 82 L.Ed. 1399 (1938).

 Both indeterminate sentencing and parole were based on concepts of the offender's possible, indeed probable, rehabilitation, a view that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate and thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal activity upon his return to society.  It obviously required the judge and the parole officer to make their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their own assessments of the offender's amenability to rehabilitation.  As a result, the court and the officer were in positions to exercise, and usually did exercise, very broad discretion.  See Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert--Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 Minn.L.Rev. 803, 812-813 (1961).  [p. 364] This led almost inevitably to the conclusion on the part of a reviewing court that the sentencing judge "sees more and senses more" than the appellate court;  thus, the judge enjoyed the "superiority of his nether position," for that court's determination as to what sentence was appropriate met with virtually unconditional deference on appeal. See Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L.Rev. 635, 663 (1971).  See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3047, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974).  The decision whether to parole was also "predictive and discretionary."  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).  The correction official possessed almost absolute discretion over the parole decision.  See, e.g., Brest v. Ciccone, 371 F.2d 981, 982-983 (CA8 1967);  Rifai v. United States Parole Comm'n, 586 F.2d 695 (CA9 1978).

 Historically, federal sentencing--the function of determining the scope and extent of punishment--never has been thought to be assigned by the Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three Branches of Government. Congress, of course, has the power to fix the sentence for a federal crime,  United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820), and the scope of judicial discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control.  Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916).  Congress early abandoned fixed-sentence rigidity, however, and put in place a system of ranges within which the sentencer could choose the precise punishment.  See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-46, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2613-14, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978). Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing judge to determine what the sentence should be within the customarily wide range so selected.  This broad discretion was further enhanced by the power later granted the judge to suspend the sentence and by the resulting growth of an elaborate probation system.  Also, with the advent of parole, Congress moved toward a "three-way sharing" of sentencing responsibility by granting corrections personnel in the Executive Branch the discretion [p. 365] to release a prisoner before the expiration of the sentence imposed by the judge.  Thus, under the indeterminate-sentence system, Congress defined the maximum, the judge imposed a sentence within the statutory range (which he usually could replace with probation), and the Executive Branch's parole official eventually determined the actual duration of imprisonment.  See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949).  See also Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1211 (CA3 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S.Ct. 1602, 80 L.Ed.2d 133 (1984); United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 190, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2243, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979);  United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1712, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965) ("[I]f a given policy can be implemented only by a combination of legislative enactment, judicial application, and executive implementation, no man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked will").

 Serious disparities in sentences, however, were common.  Rehabilitation as a sound penological theory came to be questioned and, in any event, was regarded by some as an unattainable goal for most cases.  See N. Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 24-43 (1974);  F. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal (1981).  In 1958, Congress authorized the creation of judicial sentencing institutes and joint councils, see 28 U.S.C. 334, to formulate standards and criteria for sentencing.  In 1973, the United States Parole Board adopted guidelines that established a "customary range" of confinement.  See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 391, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1206, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980).  Congress in 1976 endorsed this initiative through the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. 4201-4218, an attempt to envision for the Parole Commission a role, at least in part, "to moderate the disparities in the sentencing practices of individual judges."  United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S., at 189, 99 S.Ct., at 2242.  That Act, however, did not disturb the division of sentencing responsibility among the three Branches.  The judge continued to exercise discretion and to set the sentence within the statutory range fixed by Congress, while the prisoner's [p. 366] actual release date generally was set by the Parole Commission.

 This proved to be no more than a way station.  Fundamental and widespread dissatisfaction with the uncertainties and the disparities continued to be expressed.  Congress had wrestled with the problem for more than a decade when, in 1984, it enacted the sweeping reforms that are at issue here.

 Helpful in our consideration and analysis of the statute is the Senate Report on the 1984 legislation, S.Rep. No. 98-225 (1983), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1984, p. 3182 (Report).  The Report referred to the "outmoded rehabilitation model" for federal criminal sentencing, and recognized that the efforts of the criminal justice system to achieve rehabilitation of offenders had failed.  Id., at 38.  It observed that the indeterminate-sentencing system had two "unjustifi[ed]" and "shameful" consequences.  Id., at 38, 65.  The first was the great variation among sentences imposed by different judges upon similarly situated offenders.  The second was the uncertainty as to the time the offender would spend in prison.  Each was a serious impediment to an evenhanded and effective operation of the criminal justice system.  The Report went on to note that parole was an inadequate device for overcoming these undesirable consequences.  This was due to the division of authority between the sentencing judge and the parole officer who often worked at cross purposes;  to the fact that the Parole Commission's own guidelines did not take into account factors Congress regarded as important in sentencing, such as the sophistication of the offender and the role the offender played in an offense committed with others, id., at 48;  and to the fact that the Parole Commission had only limited power to adjust a sentence imposed by the court. Id., at 47.

 [p. 367] Before settling on a mandatory-guideline system, Congress considered other competing proposals for sentencing reform.  It rejected strict determinate sentencing because it concluded that a guideline system would be successful in reducing sentence disparities while retaining the flexibility needed to adjust for unanticipated factors arising in a particular case. Id., at 78-79, 62.  The Judiciary Committee rejected a proposal that would have made the sentencing guidelines only advisory.  Id., at 79.

B
The Act
 The Act, as adopted, revises the old sentencing process in several ways:

 1. It rejects imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation, 28 U.S.C. 994(k), and it states that punishment should serve retributive, educational, deterrent, and incapacitative goals, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2).

 2. It consolidates the power that had been exercised by the sentencing judge and the Parole Commission to decide what punishment an offender should suffer. This is done by creating the United States Sentencing Commission, directing that Commission to devise guidelines to be used for sentencing, and prospectively abolishing the Parole Commission.  28 U.S.C. 991, 994, and 995(a)(1).

 3. It makes all sentences basically determinate.  A prisoner is to be released at the completion of his sentence reduced only by any credit earned by good behavior while in custody.  18 U.S.C. 3624(a) and (b).

 4. It makes the Sentencing Commission's guidelines binding on the courts, although it preserves for the judge the discretion to depart from the guideline applicable to a particular case if the judge finds an aggravating or mitigating factor present that the Commission did not adequately consider when formulating guidelines.  3553(a) and (b).  The Act also requires the court to state its reasons for the sentence [p. 368] imposed and to give "the specific reason" for imposing a sentence different from that described in the guideline. 3553(c).

 5. It authorizes limited appellate review of the sentence.  It permits a defendant to appeal a sentence that is above the defined range, and it permits the Government to appeal a sentence that is below that range.  It also permits either side to appeal an incorrect application of the guideline.  3742(a) and (b).

 Thus, guidelines were meant to establish a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants according to various specified factors, "among others."  28 U.S.C. 994(b), (c), and (d).  The maximum of the range ordinarily may not exceed the minimum by more than the greater of 25% or six months, and each sentence is to be within the limit provided by existing law.  994(a) and (b)(2).

C
The Sentencing Commission

 The Commission is established "as an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States."  991(a).  It has seven voting members (one of whom is the Chairman) appointed by the President "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."  "At least three of the members shall be Federal judges selected after considering a list of six judges recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference of the United States."  Ibid.  No more than four members of the Commission shall be members of the same political party.  The Attorney General, or his designee, is an ex officio non-voting member.  The Chairman and other members of the Commission are subject to removal by the President "only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown."  Ibid.  Except for initial staggering of terms, [p. 369] a voting member serves for six years and may not serve more than two full terms.  992(a) and (b).

    D
    The Responsibilities of the Commission

 In addition to the duty the Commission has to promulgate determinative- sentence guidelines, it is under an obligation periodically to "review and revise" the guidelines.  994(o).  It is to "consult with authorities on, and individual and institutional representatives of, various aspects of the Federal criminal justice system."  Ibid.  It must report to Congress "any amendments of the guidelines."  994(p).  It is to make recommendations to Congress whether the grades or maximum penalties should be modified. 994(r).  It must submit to Congress at least annually an analysis of the operation of the guidelines.  994(w).  It is to issue "general policy statements" regarding their application.  994(a)(2).  And it has the power to "establish general policies ... as are necessary to carry out the purposes" of the legislation, 995(a)(1);  to "monitor the performance of probation officers" with respect to the guidelines, 995(a)(9);  to "devise and conduct periodic training programs of instruction in sentencing techniques for judicial and probation personnel" and others, 995(a)(18);  and to "perform such other functions as are required to permit Federal courts to meet their responsibilities" as to sentencing, 995(a)(22).

 We note, in passing, that the monitoring function is not without its burden.  Every year, with respect to each of more than 40,000 sentences, the federal courts must forward, and the Commission must review, the presentence report, [p. 370] the guideline worksheets, the tribunal's sentencing statement, and any written plea agreement.

II
This Litigation

 On December 10, 1987, John M. Mistretta (petitioner) and another were indicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on three counts centering in a cocaine sale.  See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 87-1904, p. 16a.  Mistretta moved to have the promulgated Guidelines ruled unconstitutional on the grounds that the Sentencing Commission was constituted in violation of the established doctrine of separation of powers, and that Congress delegated excessive authority to the Commission to structure the Guidelines.  As has been noted, the District Court was not persuaded by these contentions.

* * *

[p. 371]
III
    Delegation of Power

 Petitioner argues that in delegating the power to promulgate sentencing guidelines for every federal criminal offense to an independent Sentencing Commission, Congress has granted the Commission excessive legislative discretion in violation of the constitutionally based nondelegation doctrine. We do not agree.

 The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government.  The Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States," U.S. Const., Art. I, 1, and we long have insisted that "the integrity and maintenance of [p. 372] the system of government ordained by the Constitution" mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.  Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692, 12 S.Ct. 495, 504, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892).  We also have recognized, however, that the separation-of-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches.  In a passage now enshrined in our jurisprudence, Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, explained our approach to such cooperative ventures:  "In determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination."  J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 48 S.Ct. 348, 351, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928).  So long as Congress "shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."  Id., at 409, 48 S.Ct., at 352.

 Applying this "intelligible principle" test to congressional delegations, our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.  See Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, Wage and Hour Div. of Dept. of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 145, 61 S.Ct. 524, 533, 85 L.Ed. 624 (1941) ("In an increasingly complex society Congress obviously could not perform its functions if it were obliged to find all the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined legislative policy");  see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274, 88 S.Ct. 419, 429, 19 L.Ed.2d 508 (1967) (opinion concurring in result).  "The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function."  Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421, 55 S.Ct. 241, 248, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935).  Accordingly, this Court has deemed it "constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly [p. 373] delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority."  American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105, 67 S.Ct. 133, 142, 91 L.Ed. 103 (1946).

 Until 1935, this Court never struck down a challenged statute on delegation grounds. . . .

 In light of our approval of these broad delegations, we harbor no doubt that Congress' delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements.  Congress charged the Commission with three goals:  to "assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth" in the Act;  to "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records ... while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences," where appropriate;  and to "reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process."  28 U.S.C. 991(b)(1). Congress further specified four "purposes" of sentencing that the Commission must pursue in carrying out its mandate:  "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense";  "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct";  "to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant";  and "to provide the defendant with needed ... correctional treatment."  18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2).

 In addition, Congress prescribed the specific tool--the guidelines system--for the Commission to use in regulating sentencing.  More particularly, Congress directed the Commission to develop a system of "sentencing ranges" applicable "for each category of offense involving each category of defendant."  28 U.S.C. 994(b). [n. 8]  Congress instructed the [p. 375] Commission that these sentencing ranges must be consistent with pertinent provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code and could not include sentences in excess of the statutory maxima.  Congress also required that for sentences of imprisonment, "the maximum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment."  994(b)(2).  Moreover, Congress directed the Commission to use current average sentences "as a starting point" for its structuring of the sentencing ranges. 994(m).

 To guide the Commission in its formulation of offense categories, Congress directed it to consider seven factors:  the grade of the offense;  the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime;  the nature and degree of the harm caused by the crime;  the community view of the gravity of the offense;  the public concern generated by the crime;  the deterrent effect that a particular sentence may have on others;  and the current incidence of the offense.  994(c)(1)-(7).  Congress set forth 11 factors for the Commission to [p. 376] consider in establishing categories of defendants. These include the offender's age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, physical condition (including drug dependence), previous employment record, family ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of dependence upon crime for a livelihood.  994(d)(1)-(11). Congress also prohibited the Commission from considering the "race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders," 994(d), and instructed that the guidelines should reflect the "general inappropriateness" of considering certain other factors, such as current unemployment, that might serve as proxies for forbidden factors, 994(e).

 In addition to these overarching constraints, Congress provided even more detailed guidance to the Commission about categories of offenses and offender characteristics.  Congress directed that guidelines require a term of confinement at or near the statutory maximum for certain crimes of violence and for drug offenses, particularly when committed by recidivists.  994(h). Congress further directed that the Commission assure a substantial term of imprisonment for an offense constituting a third felony conviction, for a career [p. 377] felon, for one convicted of a managerial role in a racketeering enterprise, for a crime of violence by an offender on release from a prior felony conviction, and for an offense involving a substantial quantity of narcotics.  994(i).  Congress also instructed "that the guidelines reflect ... the general appropriateness of imposing a term of imprisonment" for a crime of violence that resulted in serious bodily injury.  On the other hand, Congress directed that guidelines reflect the general inappropriateness of imposing a sentence of imprisonment "in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense."  994(j).  Congress also enumerated various aggravating and mitigating circumstances, such as, respectively, multiple offenses or substantial assistance to the Government, to be reflected in the guidelines. 994(l ) and (n).  In other words, although Congress granted the Commission substantial discretion in formulating guidelines, in actuality it legislated a full hierarchy of punishment--from near maximum imprisonment, to substantial imprisonment, to some imprisonment, to alternatives--and stipulated the most important offense and offender characteristics to place defendants within these categories.

 We cannot dispute petitioner's contention that the Commission enjoys significant discretion in formulating guidelines.  The Commission does have discretionary authority to determine the relative severity of federal crimes and to assess the relative weight of the offender characteristics that Congress listed for the Commission to consider.  See 994(c) and (d) (Commission instructed to consider enumerated factors as it deems them to be relevant). The Commission also has significant discretion to determine which crimes have been punished too leniently, and which too severely.  994(m). Congress has called upon the Commission to exercise its judgment about which [p. 378] types of crimes and which types of criminals are to be considered similar for the purposes of sentencing.

 But our cases do not at all suggest that delegations of this type may not carry with them the need to exercise judgment on matters of policy.  In Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944), the Court upheld a delegation to the Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that "in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this Act" to stabilize prices and avert speculation.  See id., at 420, 64 S.Ct., at 665.  In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943), we upheld a delegation to the Federal Communications Commission granting it the authority to promulgate regulations in accordance with its view of the "public interest."  In Yakus, the Court laid down the applicable principle:
"It is no objection that the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call for the exercise [p. 379] of judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed statutory framework....

  * * *
"... Only if we could say that that there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the Administrator's action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of means for effecting its declared purpose...."  321 U.S., at 425-426, 64 S.Ct., at 667-668.

 Congress has met that standard here.  The Act sets forth more than merely an  "intelligible principle" or minimal standards.  One court has aptly put it: "The statute outlines the policies which prompted establishment of the Commission, explains what the Commission should do and how it should do it, and sets out specific directives to govern particular situations."  United States v. Chambless, 680 F.Supp. 793, 796 (ED La.1988).

 Developing proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially appropriate.  Although Congress has delegated significant discretion to the Commission to draw judgments from its analysis of existing sentencing practice and alternative sentencing models, "Congress is not confined to that method of executing its policy which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to administrative officers."  Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S., at 425-426, 64 S.Ct., at 668.  We have no doubt that in the hands of the Commission "the criteria which Congress has supplied are wholly adequate for carrying out the general policy and purpose" of the Act. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398, 60 S.Ct. 907, 915, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940).

[p. 380] IV
Separation of Powers

 Having determined that Congress has set forth sufficient standards for the exercise of the Commission's delegated authority, we turn to Mistretta's claim that the Act violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers.

 This Court consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.  See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-696, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2616-2622, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S., at 725, 106 S.Ct. at 3188.  Madison, in writing about the principle of separated powers, said:  "No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty."  The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).

 In applying the principle of separated powers in our jurisprudence, we have sought to give life to Madison's view of the appropriate relationship among the three coequal Branches.  Accordingly, we have recognized, as Madison admonished at the founding, that while our Constitution mandates that "each of the three general departments of government [must remain] entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others," Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629, 55 S.Ct. 869, 874, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935), the Framers did not require--and indeed rejected--the notion that the three Branches must be entirely separate and distinct.  See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2790, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977) (rejecting as archaic complete division of authority among the three Branches);  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (affirming Madison's flexible approach to separation of powers).  Madison, defending the Constitution against charges that it established insufficiently separate Branches, addressed the point directly.  Separation of powers, he wrote, "d[oes] not mean that these [three] [p. 381] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other," but rather "that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted."  The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).  See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S., at 442, n. 5, 97 S.Ct. at 2789, n. 5.  Madison recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of which "would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121, 96 S.Ct. 612, 683, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976).  In a passage now commonplace in our cases, Justice Jackson summarized the pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power to which we are heir:
"While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.  It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 870, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (concurring opinion).

 In adopting this flexible understanding of separation of powers, we simply have recognized Madison's teaching that the greatest security against tyranny--the accumulation of excessive authority in a single Branch--lies not in a hermetic division among the Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked and balanced power within each Branch.  "[T]he greatest security," wrote Madison, "against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others."  The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).  Accordingly, as we have noted [p. 382] many times, the Framers "built into the tripartite Federal Government ... a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other."  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 122, 96 S.Ct., at 684.  See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2784, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983).

 It is this concern of encroachment and aggrandizement that has animated our separation-of-powers jurisprudence and aroused our vigilance against the "hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power."  Ibid.  Accordingly, we have not hesitated to strike down provisions of law that either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate Branches or that undermine the authority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch.  For example, just as the Framers recognized the particular danger of the Legislative Branch's accreting to itself judicial or executive power, [n. 12] so too have we invalidated attempts by Congress to exercise the responsibilities of other Branches or to reassign powers vested by the Constitution in either the Judicial Branch or the Executive Branch.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (Congress may not exercise removal power over officer performing executive functions);  INS v. Chadha, supra (Congress may not control execution of laws except through Art. I procedures);  Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (Congress may not confer Art. III power on Art. I judge).  By the same token, we have upheld statutory provisions that to some degree commingle the functions of the Branches, but that pose no danger of either aggrandizement or encroachment. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988) (upholding judicial appointment of independent counsel);  Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (upholding [p. 383] agency's assumption of jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims).

12. Madison admonished:  "In republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates."  The Federalist No. 51, p. 350 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).

 In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra, upholding, against a separation-of-powers challenge, legislation providing for the General Services Administration to control Presidential papers after resignation, we described our separation-of-powers inquiry as focusing "on the extent to which [a provision of law] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."  433 U.S., at 443, 97 S.Ct., at 2790 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 711-712, 94 S.Ct., at 3109- 3110.  In cases specifically involving the Judicial Branch, we have expressed our vigilance against two dangers:  first, that the Judicial Branch neither be assigned nor allowed "tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches," Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S., at 680-681, 108 S.Ct., at 2613, and, second, that no provision of law "impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch."  Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S., at 851, 106 S.Ct., at 3258.

 Mistretta argues that the Act suffers from each of these constitutional infirmities.  He argues that Congress, in constituting the Commission as it did, effected an unconstitutional accumulation of power within the Judicial Branch while at the same time undermining the Judiciary's independence and integrity.  Specifically, petitioner claims that in delegating to an independent agency within the Judicial Branch the power to promulgate sentencing guidelines, Congress unconstitutionally has required the Branch, and individual Article III judges, to exercise not only their judicial authority, but legislative authority--the making of sentencing policy--as well.  Such rulemaking authority, petitioner contends, may be exercised by Congress, or delegated by Congress to the [p. 384] Executive, but may not be delegated to or exercised by the Judiciary.  Brief for Petitioner 21.

 At the same time, petitioner asserts, Congress unconstitutionally eroded the integrity and independence of the Judiciary by requiring Article III judges to sit on the Commission, by requiring that those judges share their rulemaking authority with nonjudges, and by subjecting the Commission's members to appointment and removal by the President.  According to petitioner, Congress, consistent with the separation of powers, may not upset the balance among the Branches by co-opting federal judges into the quintessentially political work of establishing sentencing guidelines, by subjecting those judges to the political whims of the Chief Executive, and by forcing judges to share their power with nonjudges.  Id., at 15-35.

 "When this Court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has been approved by both Houses of the Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of Congress that confronts a deeply vexing national problem, it should only do so for the most compelling constitutional reasons."  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S., at 736, 106 S.Ct., at 3194 (opinion concurring in judgment).  Although the unique composition and responsibilities of the Sentencing Commission give rise to serious concerns about a disruption of the appropriate balance of governmental power among the coordinate Branches, we conclude, upon close inspection, that petitioner's fears for the fundamental structural protections of the Constitution prove, at least in this case, to be "more smoke than fire," and do not compel us to invalidate Congress' considered scheme for resolving the seemingly intractable dilemma of excessive disparity in criminal sentencing.

A
Location of the Commission

 The Sentencing Commission unquestionably is a peculiar institution within the framework of our Government.  Although placed by the Act in the Judicial Branch, it is not a [p. 385] court and does not exercise judicial power. Rather, the Commission is an "independent" body comprised of seven voting members including at least three federal judges, entrusted by Congress with the primary task of promulgating sentencing guidelines.  28 U.S.C. 991(a). Our constitutional principles of separated powers are not violated, however, by mere anomaly or innovation.  Setting to one side, for the moment, the question whether the composition of the Sentencing Commission violates the separation of powers, we observe that Congress' decision to create an independent rulemaking body to promulgate sentencing guidelines and to locate that body within the Judicial Branch is not unconstitutional unless Congress has vested in the Commission powers that are more appropriately performed by the other Branches or that undermine the integrity of the Judiciary.

 According to express provision of Article III, the judicial power of the United States is limited to "Cases" and "Controversies."  See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356, 31 S.Ct. 250, 253, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911).  In implementing this limited grant of power, we have refused to issue advisory opinions or to resolve disputes that are not justiciable.  See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct.1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968);  United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 14 L.Ed. 40 (1852).  These doctrines help to ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch by precluding debilitating entanglements between the Judiciary and the two political Branches, and prevent the Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved for the other Branches by extending judicial power to matters beyond those disputes "traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process."  Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 97, 88 S.Ct., at 1951;  see also United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S., at 396, 100 S.Ct., at 1208.  As a general principle, we stated as recently as last Term that " 'executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution.' " Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S., at 677, 108 S.Ct., at 2612, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 123, 96 S.Ct., at 684, citing in turn United States v. Ferreira, supra, and  Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792).

 [p. 386] Nonetheless, we have recognized significant exceptions to this general rule and have approved the assumption of some nonadjudicatory activities by the Judicial Branch.  In keeping with Justice Jackson's Youngstown admonition that the separation of powers contemplates the integration of dispersed powers into a workable Government, we have recognized the constitutionality of a "twilight area" in which the activities of the separate Branches merge.  In his dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926), Justice Brandeis explained that the separation of powers "left to each [Branch] power to exercise, in some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial."  Id., at 291, 47 S.Ct., at 84.

 That judicial rulemaking, at least with respect to some subjects, falls within this twilight area is no longer an issue for dispute.  None of our cases indicate that rulemaking per se is a function that may not be performed by an entity within the Judicial Branch, either because rulemaking is inherently nonjudicial or because it is a function exclusively committed to the Executive Branch.  On the contrary, we specifically [p. 387] have held that Congress, in some circumstances, may confer rulemaking authority on the Judicial Branch.  In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941), we upheld a challenge to certain rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which conferred upon the Judiciary the power to promulgate federal rules of civil procedure.  See 28 U.S.C. 2072.  We observed:  "Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States."  312 U.S., at 9-10, 61 S.Ct., at 424 (footnote omitted).  This passage in Sibbach simply echoed what had been our view since Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825), decided more than a century earlier, where Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court that rulemaking power pertaining to the Judicial Branch may be "conferred on the judicial department."  Discussing this delegation of rulemaking power, the Court found Congress authorized
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.  The judicial department is invested with jurisdiction in certain specified cases, in all which it has power to render judgment.
[p. 388] "That a power to make laws for carrying into execution all the judgments which the judicial department has power to pronounce, is expressly conferred by this clause, seems to be one of those plain propositions which reasoning cannot render plainer."  Id., at 22.
 See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965).  Pursuant to this power to delegate rulemaking authority to the Judicial Branch, Congress expressly has authorized this Court to establish rules for the conduct of its own business and to prescribe rules of procedure for lower federal courts in bankruptcy cases, in other civil cases, and in criminal cases, and to revise the Federal Rules of Evidence.  See generally J. Weinstein, Reform of Court Rule-Making Procedures (1977).

 Our approach to other nonadjudicatory activities that Congress has vested either in federal courts or in auxiliary bodies within the Judicial Branch has been identical to our approach to judicial rulemaking:  consistent with the separation of powers, Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch nonadjudicatory functions that do not trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary. Following this approach, we specifically have upheld not only Congress' power to confer on the Judicial Branch the rulemaking authority contemplated in the various enabling Acts, but also to vest in judicial councils authority to "make 'all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.' "  Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 86, n. 7, 90 S.Ct. 1648, 1654, n. 7, 26 L.Ed.2d100 (1970), quoting 28 U.S.C. 332 (1970 ed.).  Though not the subject of constitutional challenge, by established practice we have recognized Congress' power to create the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Rules Advisory Committees that it oversees, and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts whose myriad responsibilities [p. 389] include the administration of the entire probation service. These entities, some of which are comprised of judges, others of judges and nonjudges, still others of nonjudges only, do not exercise judicial power in the constitutional sense of deciding cases and controversies, but they share the common purpose of providing for the fair and efficient fulfillment of responsibilities that are properly the province of the Judiciary.  Thus, although the judicial power of the United States is limited by express provision of Article III to "Cases" and "Controversies," we have never held, and have clearly disavowed in practice, that the Constitution prohibits Congress from assigning to courts or auxiliary bodies within the Judicial Branch administrative or rulemaking duties that, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, are "necessary and proper ... for carrying into execution all the judgments which the judicial department has power to pronounce."  Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat., at 22. Because of their [p. 390] close relation to the central mission of the Judicial Branch, such extrajudicial activities are consonant with the integrity of the Branch and are not more appropriate for another Branch.

 In light of this precedent and practice, we can discern no separation-of-powers impediment to the placement of the Sentencing Commission within the Judicial Branch.  As we described at the outset, the sentencing function long has been a peculiarly shared responsibility among the Branches of Government and has never been thought of as the exclusive constitutional province of any one Branch.  See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S., at 188-189, 99 S.Ct., at 2242.  For more than a century, federal judges have enjoyed wide discretion to determine the appropriate sentence in individual cases and have exercised special authority to determine the sentencing factors to be applied in any given case.  Indeed, the legislative history of the Act makes clear that Congress' decision to place the Commission within the Judicial Branch reflected Congress' "strong feeling" that sentencing has been and should remain "primarily a judicial function."  Report, at 159. That Congress should vest such rulemaking in the Judicial Branch, far from being "incongruous" or vesting within the Judiciary responsibilities that more appropriately belong to another Branch, simply acknowledges the role that [p. 391] the Judiciary always has played, and continues to play, in sentencing. [n. 17]

 Given the consistent responsibility of federal judges to pronounce sentence within the statutory range established by Congress, we find that the role of the Commission in promulgating guidelines for the exercise of that judicial function bears considerable similarity to the role of this Court in establishing rules of procedure under the various enabling Acts.  Such guidelines, like the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, are court rules--rules, to paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall's language in Wayman, for carrying into execution judgments that the Judiciary has the power to pronounce.  Just as the rules of procedure bind judges and courts in the proper management of the cases before them, so the Guidelines bind judges and courts in the exercise of their uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in criminal cases.  In other words, the Commission's functions, like this Court's function in promulgating procedural rules, are clearly attendant to a central element of the historically acknowledged mission of the Judicial Branch.

 Petitioner nonetheless objects that the analogy between the Guidelines and the rules of procedure is flawed:  Although the Judicial Branch may participate in rulemaking and administrative work that is "procedural" in nature, it may not assume, it is said, the "substantive" authority over sentencing [p. 392] policy that Congress has delegated to the Commission.  Such substantive decisionmaking, petitioner contends, entangles the Judicial Branch in essentially political work of the other Branches and unites both judicial and legislative power in the Judicial Branch.

 We agree with petitioner that the nature of the Commission's rulemaking power is not strictly analogous to this Court's rulemaking power under the enabling Acts.  Although we are loath to enter the logical morass of distinguishing between substantive and procedural rules, see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) (distinction between substance and procedure depends on context), and although we have recognized that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regulate matters "falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, [and] are rationally capable of classification as either," Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S., at 472, 85 S.Ct., at 1144, we recognize that the task of promulgating rules regulating practice and pleading before federal courts does not involve the degree of political judgment integral to the Commission's formulation of sentencing guidelines. [n. 18]  To be sure, all rulemaking is nonjudicial in the sense that rules impose standards of general application divorced from the individual fact situation which ordinarily forms the predicate for judicial action.  Also, this Court's rulemaking under the enabling Acts has been substantive and political in the sense that the rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of litigants.  Nonetheless, the degree of [p. 393] political judgment about crime and criminality exercised by the Commission and the scope of the substantive effects of its work does to some extent set its rulemaking powers apart from prior judicial rulemaking.  Cf. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (state sentencing guidelines not procedural).

 We do not believe, however, that the significantly political nature of the Commission's work renders unconstitutional its placement within the Judicial Branch.  Our separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity as "substantive" as opposed to "procedural," or "political" as opposed to "judicial."  See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S., at 749, 106 S.Ct., at 3200 ("[G]overnmental power cannot always be readily characterized with only one ... labe[l]") (opinion concurring in judgment). Rather, our inquiry is focused on the "unique aspects of the congressional plan at issue and its practical consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie Article III."  Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S., at 857, 106 S.Ct., at 3261.  In this case, the "practical consequences" of locating the Commission within the Judicial Branch pose no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial Branch or of expanding the powers of the Judiciary beyond constitutional bounds by uniting within the Branch the political or quasi-legislative power of the Commission with the judicial power of the courts.

 First, although the Commission is located in the Judicial Branch, its powers are not united with the powers of the Judiciary in a way that has meaning for separation-of-powers analysis.  Whatever constitutional problems might arise if the powers of the Commission were vested in a court, the Commission is not a court, does not exercise judicial power, and is not controlled by or accountable to members of the Judicial Branch.  The Commission, on which members of the Judiciary may be a minority, is an independent agency in every relevant sense.  In contrast to a court's exercising judicial power, the Commission is fully accountable to Congress, which can revoke or amend any or all of the Guidelines [p. 394] as it sees fit either within the 180-day waiting period, see 235(a)(1)(B)(ii)(III) of the Act, 98 Stat. 2032, or at any time.  In contrast to a court, the Commission's members are subject to the President's limited powers of removal.  In contrast to a court, its rulemaking is subject to the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. 994(x).  While we recognize the continuing vitality of Montesquieu's admonition:  " 'Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul,' " The Federalist No. 47, p. 326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison), quoting Montesquieu, because Congress vested the power to promulgate sentencing guidelines in an independent agency, not a court, there can be no serious argument that Congress combined legislative and judicial power within the Judicial Branch.

 [p. 395] Second, although the Commission wields rulemaking power and not the adjudicatory power exercised by individual judges when passing sentence, the placement of the Sentencing Commission in the Judicial Branch has not increased the Branch's authority.  Prior to the passage of the Act, the Judicial Branch, as an aggregate, decided precisely the questions assigned to the Commission:  what sentence is appropriate to what criminal conduct under what circumstances.  It was the everyday business of judges, taken collectively, to evaluate and weigh the various aims of sentencing and to apply those aims to the individual cases that came before them.  The Sentencing Commission does no more than this, albeit basically through the methodology of sentencing guidelines, rather than entirely individualized sentencing determinations.  Accordingly, in placing the Commission in the Judicial Branch, Congress cannot be said to have aggrandized the authority of that Branch or to have deprived the Executive Branch of a power it once possessed.  Indeed, because the Guidelines have the effect of promoting sentencing within a narrower range than was previously applied, the power of the Judicial Branch is, if anything, somewhat diminished by the Act.  And, since Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate its own authority, the Act does not unconstitutionally diminish Congress' authority.  Thus, although Congress has authorized the Commission to exercise a greater degree of political judgment than has been exercised in the past by any one entity within the Judicial Branch, in the unique context of sentencing, this authorization does nothing to upset the balance of power among the Branches.

 What Mistretta's argument comes down to, then, is not that the substantive responsibilities of the Commission aggrandize the Judicial Branch, but that that Branch is inevitably weakened by its participation in policymaking.  We do not believe, however, that the placement within the Judicial [p. 396] Branch of an independent agency charged with the promulgation of sentencing guidelines can possibly be construed as preventing the Judicial Branch "from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."  Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S., at 443, 97 S.Ct., at 2790. Despite the substantive nature of its work, the Commission is not incongruous or inappropriate to the Branch.  As already noted, sentencing is a field in which the Judicial Branch long has exercised substantive or political judgment.  What we said in Morrison when upholding the power of the Special Division to appoint independent counsel applies with even greater force here: "This is not a case in which judges are given power ... in an area in which they have no special knowledge or expertise."  487 U.S., at 676, n. 13, 108 S.Ct., at 2611, n. 13.  On the contrary, Congress placed the Commission in the Judicial Branch precisely because of the Judiciary's special knowledge and expertise.

 Nor do the Guidelines, though substantive, involve a degree of political authority inappropriate for a nonpolitical Branch.  Although the Guidelines are intended to have substantive effects on public behavior (as do the rules of procedure), they do not bind or regulate the primary conduct of the public or vest in the Judicial Branch the legislative responsibility for establishing minimum and maximum penalties for every crime.  They do no more than fetter the discretion of sentencing judges to do what they have done for generations-- impose sentences within the broad limits established by Congress.  Given their limited reach, the special role of the Judicial Branch in the field of sentencing, and the fact that the Guidelines are promulgated by an independent agency and not a court, it follows that as a matter of "practical consequences" the location of the Sentencing Commission within the Judicial Branch simply leaves with the Judiciary what long has belonged to it.

 In sum, since substantive judgment in the field of sentencing has been and remains appropriate to the Judicial Branch, and the methodology of rulemaking has been and remains appropriate [p. 397] to that Branch, Congress' considered decision to combine these functions in an independent Sentencing Commission and to locate that Commission within the Judicial Branch does not violate the principle of separation of powers.

* * *

[p. 412] V

 We conclude that in creating the Sentencing Commission--an unusual hybrid in structure and authority--Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power nor upset the constitutionally mandated balance of powers among the coordinate Branches.  The Constitution's structural protections do not prohibit Congress from delegating to an expert body located within the Judicial Branch the intricate task of formulating sentencing guidelines consistent with such significant statutory direction as is present here.  Nor does our system of checked and balanced authority prohibit Congress from calling upon the accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch in creating policy on a matter uniquely within the ken of judges.  Accordingly, we hold that the Act is constitutional.

 The judgment of United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri is affirmed.

 It is so ordered.
 

 [p. 413] Justice SCALIA, dissenting.

 While the products of the Sentencing Commission's labors have been given the modest name "Guidelines," see 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. IV);  United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (June 15, 1988), they have the force and effect of laws, prescribing the sentences criminal defendants are to receive.  A judge who disregards them will be reversed, 18 U.S.C. 3742 (1982 ed., Supp. IV).  I dissent from today's decision because I can find no place within our constitutional system for an agency created by Congress to exercise no governmental power other than the making of laws.

I

 There is no doubt that the Sentencing Commission has established significant, legally binding prescriptions governing application of governmental power against private individuals--indeed, application of the ultimate governmental power, short of capital punishment. Statutorily permissible sentences for particular crimes cover as broad a range as zero years to life, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1201 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV) (kidnaping), and within those ranges the Commission was given broad discretion to prescribe the "correct" sentence, 28 U.S.C. 994(b)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).  Average prior sentences were to be a starting point for the Commission's inquiry, 994(m), but it could and regularly did deviate from those averages as it thought appropriate.  It chose, for example, to prescribe substantial increases over average prior sentences for white-collar crimes such as public corruption, antitrust violations, and tax evasion.  Guidelines, [p. 414] at 2.31, 2.133, 2.140.  For antitrust violations, before the Guidelines only 39% of those convicted served any imprisonment, and the average imprisonment was only 45 days, id., at 2.133, whereas the Guidelines prescribe base sentences (for defendants with no prior criminal conviction) ranging from 2-to-8 months to 10- to-16 months, depending upon the volume of commerce involved.  See id., at 2.131, 5.2.

 The Commission also determined when probation was permissible, imposing a strict system of controls because of its judgment that probation had been used for an "inappropriately high percentage of offenders guilty of certain economic crimes."  Id., at 1.8.  Moreover, the Commission had free rein in determining whether statutorily authorized fines should be imposed in addition to imprisonment, and if so, in what amounts.  It ultimately decided that every nonindigent offender should pay a fine according to a schedule devised by the Commission.  Id., at 5.18.  Congress also gave the Commission discretion to determine whether 7 specified characteristics of offenses, and 11 specified characteristics of offenders, "have any relevance," and should be included among the factors varying the sentence.  28 U.S.C. 994(c), (d) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).  Of the latter, it included only three among the factors required to be considered, and declared the remainder not ordinarily relevant.  Guidelines, at 5.29-5.31.

 It should be apparent from the above that the decisions made by the Commission are far from technical, but are heavily laden (or ought to be) with value judgments and policy assessments.  This fact is sharply reflected in the Commission's product, as described by the dissenting Commissioner:  "Under the guidelines, the judge could give the same sentence for abusive sexual contact that puts the child in fear as for unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States.  Similarly, the guidelines permit equivalent sentences for the following pairs of offenses:  drug [p. 415] trafficking and a violation of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act;  arson with a destructive device and failure to surrender a cancelled naturalization certificate;  operation of a common carrier under the influence of drugs that causes injury and alteration of one motor vehicle identification number; illegal trafficking in explosives and trespass;  interference with a flight attendant and unlawful conduct relating to contraband cigarettes;  aggravated assault and smuggling $11,000 worth of fish."  Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission 6-7 (May 1, 1987) (citations omitted).

 Petitioner's most fundamental and far-reaching challenge to the Commission is that Congress' commitment of such broad policy responsibility to any institution is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.  It is difficult to imagine a principle more essential to democratic government than that upon which the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is founded:  Except in a few areas constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch, the basic policy decisions governing society are to be made by the Legislature.  Our Members of Congress could not, even if they wished, vote all power to the President and adjourn sine die.

 But while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts.  Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a question of degree.  As Chief Justice Taft expressed the point for the Court in the landmark case of J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United [p. 416] States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 48 S.Ct. 348, 351, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928), the limits of delegation "must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination." Since Congress is no less endowed with common sense than we are, and better equipped to inform itself of the "necessities" of government;  and since the factors bearing upon those necessities are both multifarious and (in the nonpartisan sense) highly political--including, for example, whether the Nation is at war, see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944), or whether for other reasons "emergency is instinct in the situation," Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America v. Connally, 337 F.Supp. 737, 752 (DC 1971) (three-judge court)--it is small wonder that we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.  As the Court points out, we have invoked the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation to invalidate a law only twice in our history, over half a century ago.  See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935);  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935).  What legislated standard, one must wonder, can possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have repeatedly upheld, in various contexts, a "public interest" standard?  See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-217, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1009-1010, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943); New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25, 53 S.Ct. 45, 48, 77 L.Ed. 138 (1932).

 In short, I fully agree with the Court's rejection of petitioner's contention that the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority has been violated because of the lack of intelligible, congressionally prescribed standards to guide the Commission.

II

 Precisely because the scope of delegation is largely uncontrollable by the courts, we must be particularly rigorous in [p. 417] preserving the Constitution's structural restrictions that deter excessive delegation.  The major one, it seems to me, is that the power to make law cannot be exercised by anyone other than Congress, except in conjunction with the lawful exercise of executive or judicial power.

 The whole theory of lawful congressional "delegation" is not that Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore assign its responsibility of making law to someone else;  but rather that a certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to determine--up to a point--how small or how large that degree shall be.  Thus, the courts could be given the power to say precisely what constitutes a "restraint of trade," see Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911), or to adopt rules of procedure, see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 22, 61 S.Ct. 422, 429, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941), or to prescribe by rule the manner in which their officers shall execute their judgments, Wayman v. Southard,, 23 U.S. 1, 10 Wheat. 1, 45, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825), because that "lawmaking" was ancillary to their exercise of judicial powers.  And the Executive could be given the power to adopt policies and rules specifying in detail what radio and television licenses will be in the "public interest, convenience or necessity," because that was ancillary to the exercise of its executive powers in granting and policing licenses and making a "fair and equitable allocation" of the electromagnetic spectrum.  See Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285, 53 S.Ct. 627, 636, 77 L.Ed. 1166 (1933).  Or to take examples closer to the case before us:  Trial judges could be given the power to determine [p. 418] what factors justify a greater or lesser sentence within the statutorily prescribed limits because that was ancillary to their exercise of the judicial power of pronouncing sentence upon individual defendants.  And the President, through the Parole Commission subject to his appointment and removal, could be given the power to issue Guidelines specifying when parole would be available, because that was ancillary to the President's exercise of the executive power to hold and release federal prisoners.  See 18 U.S.C. 4203(a)(1) and (b);  28 CFR 2.20 (1988).

 As Justice Harlan wrote for the Court in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892):
" 'The true distinction ... is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.  The first cannot be done;  to the latter no valid objection can be made.' "  Id., at 693-694, 12 S.Ct., at 505 (emphasis added), quoting Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88-89 (1852).
" 'Half the statutes on our books are in the alternative, depending on the discretion of some person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing them.  But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.' "  Id., at 694, 12 S.Ct. at 505 (emphasis added), quoting Moers v. Reading, 21 Pa. 188, 202 (1853).
 In United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517, 31 S.Ct. 480, 483, 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911), which upheld a statutory grant of authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to make rules and regulations governing use of the public forests he was charged with managing, the Court said:
[p. 419] "From the beginning of the Government various acts have been passed conferring upon executive officers power to make rules and regulations--not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern.  None of these statutes could confer legislative power."  (Emphasis added.)
 Or, finally, as Chief Justice Taft described it in Hampton & Co., 276 U.S., at 406, 48 S.Ct., at 351:
"The field of Congress involves all and many varieties of legislative action, and Congress has found it frequently necessary to use officers of the Executive Branch, within defined limits, to secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in such officers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and directing the details of its execution, even to the extent of providing for penalizing a breach of such regulations." (Emphasis added.)

 The focus of controversy, in the long line of our so-called excessive delegation cases, has been whether the degree of generality contained in the authorization for exercise of executive or judicial powers in a particular field is so unacceptably high as to amount to a delegation of legislative powers.  I say "so-called excessive delegation" because although that convenient terminology is often used, what is really at issue is whether there has been any delegation of legislative power, which occurs (rarely) when Congress authorizes the exercise of executive or judicial power without adequate standards.  Strictly speaking, there is no acceptable delegation of legislative power.  As John Locke put it almost 300 years ago, "[t]he power of the legislative being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other, than what the positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative[p. 420] can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other hands."  J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government 87 (R. Cox ed.1982) (emphasis added).  Or as we have less epigrammatically said:  "That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."  Field v. Clark, supra, 143 U.S. at 692, 12 S.Ct., at 504.  In the present case, however, a pure delegation of legislative power is precisely what we have before us.  It is irrelevant whether the standards are adequate, because they are not standards related to the exercise of executive or judicial powers;  they are, plainly and simply, standards for further legislation.

 The lawmaking function of the Sentencing Commission is completely divorced from any responsibility for execution of the law or adjudication of private rights under the law.  It is divorced from responsibility for execution of the law not only because the Commission is not said to be "located in the Executive Branch" (as I shall discuss presently, I doubt whether Congress can "locate" an entity within one Branch or another for constitutional purposes by merely saying so);  but, more importantly, because the Commission neither exercises any executive power on its own, nor is subject to the control of the President who does.  The only functions it performs, apart from prescribing the law, 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1), (3) (1982 ed., Supp. IV), conducting the investigations useful and necessary for prescribing the law, e.g., 995(a)(13), (15), (16), (21), and clarifying the intended application of the law that it prescribes, e.g., 994(a)(2), 995(a)(10), are data collection and intragovernmental advice giving and education, e.g., 995(a)(8), (9), (12), (17), (18), (20).  These latter activities--similar to functions performed by congressional agencies and even congressional staff-- neither determine nor affect private rights, and do not constitute an exercise of governmental power.  See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628, 55 S.Ct. 869, 874, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935).  And the Commission's [p. 421] lawmaking is completely divorced from the exercise of judicial powers since, not being a court, it has no judicial powers itself, nor is it subject to the control of any other body with judicial powers.  The power to make law at issue here, in other words, is not ancillary but quite naked. The situation is no different in principle from what would exist if Congress gave the same power of writing sentencing laws to a congressional agency such as the General Accounting Office, or to members of its staff.

 The delegation of lawmaking authority to the Commission is, in short, unsupported by any legitimating theory to explain why it is not a delegation of legislative power.  To disregard structural legitimacy is wrong in itself--but since structure has purpose, the disregard also has adverse practical consequences.  In this case, as suggested earlier, the consequence is to facilitate and encourage judicially uncontrollable delegation.  Until our decision last Term in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), it could have been said that Congress could delegate lawmaking authority only at the expense of increasing the power of either the President or the courts.  Most often, as a practical matter, it would be the President, since the judicial process is unable to conduct the investigations and make the political assessments essential for most policymaking.  Thus, the need for delegation would have to be important enough to induce Congress to aggrandize its primary competitor for political power, and the recipient of the policymaking authority, while not Congress itself, would at least be politically accountable.  But even after it has been accepted, pursuant to  Morrison, that those exercising executive power need not be subject to the control of the President, Congress would still be more reluctant to augment the power of even an independent executive agency than to create an otherwise powerless repository for its delegation.  Moreover, assembling the full-time senior personnel for an agency exercising executive powers is more difficult than borrowing other officials (or employing new officers on a [p. 422] short-term basis) to head an organization such as the Sentencing Commission.

 By reason of today's decision, I anticipate that Congress will find delegation of its lawmaking powers much more attractive in the future.  If rulemaking can be entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial or executive powers, I foresee all manner of "expert" bodies, insulated from the political process, to which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility.  How tempting to create an expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D.'s, with perhaps a few Ph.D.'s in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, "no-win" political issues as the withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospitals, or the use of fetal tissue for research.  This is an undemocratic precedent that we set--not because of the scope of the delegated power, but because its recipient is not one of the three Branches of Government.  The only governmental power the Commission possesses is the power to make law;  and it is not the Congress.

*  * *

 I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision, and would reverse the judgment of the District Court.